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Nowadays process safety is a key issue at the design and operation of a production
process. Unfortunately, at the application of process hazard analysis (PHA) techniques
the time aspect of operation and the dynamical behaviour of the process are neglected.
This is due to the small number of easily available tools which can be applied to perform
dynamical process simulation and dynamical analysis. However, in recent times dynami-
cal models are increasingly applied to support the solution of any tasks related to process
safety. Another problem that makes it difficult to take into account time, is the lack of a
standardized concept and evaluation system to integrate the obtained information into the
design procedure of safety integrated system (SIS). The aim of this article is to investi-
gate the role of time in the design of process safety elements (PSEs), and to define the
connection between the process and the time by using the process safety time (PST)
term, as well as to give a methodology how PST can be designed based on the process
simulator and applied in the development of PSEs. The developed methodology is based
on dynamical analysis of the system and the possible safety actions. Based on this meth-
odology, an algorithm has been developed to detect unsafe situations and to determine
the necessary safety actions that can be used to avoid the undesired states of operation.
The algorithm has been applied in the solution of an industrial problem related to reactor
runaway.
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1. Introduction
Nowadays process safety is a key issue in the
design and operation phases of a production pro-
cess. The development of a SIS and the identifica-
tion of possible hazards by any kind of PHA tech-
niques, require well-detailed knowledge about the
technology.1 Beside classical alarm management,
a SIS performs specified functions to achieve or
maintain the safe state of the process when unac-
ceptable or dangerous process conditions are de-
tected. Safe state is a state of the process operation
where the hazardous event occurs with a very low
probability. The set of safe states defines the safe
operating regions.
A logic solver is required to receive the sensor
input signal(s), to make appropriate decisions based
on the nature of the signal(s), and to change its out-
puts according to user-defined logic. Next, the
change of the logic solver output(s) results in the fi-
nal element(s) taking action on the process (e.g.
closing a valve) to bring it (back) to a safe state. To
avoid possible abnormal situations, one or more in-
dependent protection layers can be applied. To ana-
lyze the number of protection layers and to design
each layer the layer of protection analysis (LOPA)
can be applied.2 The possible protection layers have
a hierarchy where process design and the basic pro-
cess control systems are at the bottom level. Hence,
the design of a reliable and controllable process is
crucial.
Unfortunately, in these techniques the time and
dynamic behaviour of the process are neglected.
This is due to the small number of easily available
tools which can be applied to perform dynamical
process simulation. Often the supplement of this
kind of tool is just the first problem; since informa-
tion about the dynamic behaviour of the process is
needed to develop process simulators there is a
need for information about the dynamic behaviour
of the process. It should not be forgotten that ac-
quiring necessary information always has a price.
In the process industry, the information about the
process is usually measured data which can be (or
should be) completed with the operator’s experi-
ences. In recent years, huge amounts of data are
collected every second, and archived even in the
simplest technology. Hence, mathematical models
can be integrated into safety analysis of a working
process in low-cost by processing the archived data.
The problem with model development arises when
the mathematical model of a non-existent process
T. VARGA and J. ABONYI, Novel Method for the Determination of Process Safety …, Chem. Biochem. Eng. Q. 24 (3) 283–293 (2010) 283
*Corresponding author: vargat@fmt.uni-pannon.hu
Original scientific paper
Received: May 27, 2009
Accepted: May 6, 2010
must be compiled to support the design of the pro-
cess. For obtaining necessary information, many
experiments must be designed and performed,
which significantly increases the cost of the model
development.
Fortunately, the importance of models in safety
analysis was recognized by some research groups in
the past decade and the dynamical models were in-
creasingly applied to support the solution of any
tasks related to process safety.3–6 The usage of
mathematical models allows not only to generate
the deviations from normal operating conditions,
but also to simulate and analyze the influence of
these deviations and the trajectory of the possible
safety actions.
Another problem that makes it difficult to take
into account time, is the lack of a standardized con-
cept and evaluation system to integrate the obtained
information into the design procedure of SIS. The
possible explanations of time in safety analysis are
summarized in Table 1. Next to the meaning of
time, the introduced ways of determination are also
collected based on sources. Table 1 can be sepa-
rated into three parts based on different time aspects
in each source. Some examples for the probabilistic
approach to time in SIS can be seen in the top sec-
tion of Table 1. The middle section collects some
examples from the viewpoint of dynamical behav-
iour of PSEs, while the last section introduces the
time aspects from dynamical behaviour of the pro-
cess. However, a method to determine PST is not
given. PSEs are the possible safety actions, which
can be applied to prevent the operation from the de-
velopment of abnormal situations.
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T a b l e 1
– Possible explanations for process safety time
Name Meaning Way of determination Source
Time of occurrence The time when fault occurs. To predict time of occurrence, scale maps are
applied based on a general relationship be-
tween length and time scales that reflect the
time constants over which phenomena occur
at different lengths of behavior.
[7]
Mean Time To Failure Mean time for failure to occur. In the reliability prediction simulation,
Weibull distributions are applied to calculate
the hazard rates.
[8]
Reaction time The reaction time is conceptualized as the
minimum time required to execute the re-
quested motor response once the stimulus has
been detected.
Reaction time is measured based on the appli-
cation of race models.
[9]
Execution time Measured execution time of the system. Execution time is measured. [10]
Expected time to repair Average time to recognize the cause of
out-of-control and repair the process
It is based on experience gained in earlier
studies.
[11]
Response time The time between detection of the event and
response of the system.
ARAMIS approach is applied to calculate the
response time.
[12]
Safety reaction time The time needed to detect a problem and initi-
ate a safety shut down to the control element.
To calculate safety reaction time an algorithm
is developed based on the known process con-
trol safety connection parameters in network.
[13]
Time-in-Alarm The time between timestamps of alarm and re-
turn-to-normal events.
To determine Time-in-Alarm it is recom-
mended to perform some simulation experi-
ments.
[14]
Irreducible minimum The minimum time of response, usually ap-
proximately 100 ms.
This is a theoretical minimum. [15]
PST PST of a given process is in essence the
fault-tolerant time of that process, prior to be-
coming a dangerous condition.
There is no information how to determine. [16]
PST PST is the time between detection of the haz-
ard and the time to bring a process to a safety
state.
The determination of PST should be based on
experience.
[17]
PST PST is the period of time in which the process
can be operated without protection and with-
out entering a dangerous condition.
It is determined by the process, so it should be
determined by some measurements.
[18]
The aim of this paper was to investigate the
role of time in the development of PSEs and to de-
fine the connection between the process and time
by using the PST term. In our case, PST means the
operating time before the detection of unsafe situa-
tions to avoid the development of these unsafe situ-
ations as shown in Fig. 1. Apart from defining this
connection, the further aim was to give a methodol-
ogy how PST can be determined based on the pro-
cess simulator and applied in the development of
PSEs.
The essentials of the proposed methodology
are the simulation of the effect of safety elements
over a prediction horizon. Since different safety ac-
tions have different time demand to avoid the evo-
lution of the unsafe situation (i.e. PST), the process
operators should know which safety action(s)
should be taken in a given time. For this purpose, a
method for model based predictive stability analy-
sis has been worked out based on the Lyapunov’s
stability analysis of simulated state trajectories. The
introduced algorithm can be applied to explore the
stable and unstable operating regimes of a process
(set of safe states) and to determine the PST of each
investigated safety elements, which information can
be used in predictive alarm management (PAM).
The developed methodology has been applied to an
industrial benchmark problem related to reactor
runaway.
Runaway means a sudden and considerable
change in the process variables, hence it is a serious
problem in many chemical industrial technologies
where exothermic reaction(s) takes place, like oxi-
dation processes and some polymerization technol-
ogies.19–21 In case of a highly exothermic reaction,
the thermal runaway occurs when the reaction rate
excesses due to a temperature increase, causing a
further temperature increase and hence a further in-
crease in the reaction rate. It has contributed to seri-
ous industrial chemical accidents, most notably the
1984 explosion of a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal,
India, that produced methyl isocyanate, and the di-
saster in Seveso, Italy, in 1976 which raised and
stiffened industrial safety regulations. Thermal run-
away is also a concern in hydrocracking and oil re-
finery processes. Detection of runaway has two
main important aspects. On one hand, the runaway
forecast has a safety aspect, since it is important for
avoiding the damage of constructional material or
in the worst case the explosion of the reactor. On
the other hand, it has a technological aspect, since
the forecast of the runaway can be used to avoid de-
velopment of hot spots in the catalytic bed, which
speed up catalyst ageing, or for preventing the pro-
duction of by-products in huge mass, like in the
synthesis of 2-octanone from 2-octanol.4,20,22 A con-
trol system that is able to modify accordingly the
operating conditions of the reactor in time decreases
the costs and increases operation safety. The first
step in developing such a control system is the gen-
eration of a reliable runaway criterion. Runaway
criteria can be based on historical process data or
the process model.23–27 The application of data-based
criterion requires measured data. This means there
have to be restrictions on the forecasting in the de-
velopment of runaway. Another problem with
data-based methods is found in measurement condi-
tions, e.g. measurement noise can result in false
forecast. Model-based criteria require parameter
sensitivity and/or stability analysis, so for the appli-
cation of these kinds of criteria it is necessary to
have an exact process model with correct model pa-
rameters. The stability analysis is a powerful tool
for determining the boundary of stable operation
conditions. Such an investigation can be based on
the analysis of the mathematical reactor model with
Lyapunov’s indirect stability analysis method.28,29
Lyapunov functions allow the determination of sta-
bility for nonlinear systems without the need to find
exact solutions.30 The method is based on the calcu-
lation of eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix. There-
fore, the Jacobian matrix of the model must be de-
termined, which can be made by the derivation of
the model equations with respect to state variables.
The next step of Lyapunov’s analysis is the calcula-
tion of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix. In
case all the real parts of the eigenvalues are nega-
tive, then the model is stable. However, if one of
the real parts of the eigenvalues is positive, the
model will be unstable at the investigated operating
point.
The paper is organized as follows: to demon-
strate our approach to the determination of PST, the
developed algorithm based on PAM is introduced in
section 2. The developed algorithm has been ap-
plied to determine PST in case of an industrial used
packed bed tubular reactor with a highly exother-
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F i g . 1 – Mean of PST
mic reaction. Finally, section 4 summarizes the
most important conclusions and highlights the mes-
sage of this work.
2. Novel method for the determination
of process safety time
Advanced process control (APC) systems
should be able to forecast the variation of the oper-
ating conditions that might decrease production
costs and increase the safety of production.31 Proba-
bly due to this reason, process stability is given by
two thirds of the APC users as a main profit factor
but only by less than 50 % of the APC suppliers.
Process stability ensures that the product meets cus-
tomer specifications consistently and that opera-
tions run smoothly. Alarm management can be ap-
plied to satisfy these expectations.
The function of alarm management is to deter-
mine possible process hazards, and to give a solu-
tion on how to reduce the impact of the detected
hazards. Each individual alarm is designed to pro-
vide an alert when that process indication differs
from normal state. During an abnormal condition,
the board operator is confronted with making deci-
sions on numerous tasks that must be performed in
an appropriate sequence. The timing and order of
execution of these tasks determines the outcome of
the operator’s effort. For example, if two process
variables deviate from normal values and can po-
tentially cause the same significant loss, the opera-
tor should quickly decide which variable to address
first. In such a case, the operator must take an ac-
tion to address the variable that is more volatile or
can reach the point of loss in the shortest time.
Therefore, the shorter the time available to respond,
the higher the priority of the alarm will be, assum-
ing equal consequences can result. In an effective
alarm management system, the main goal is to min-
imize the number and impact of abnormal situa-
tions. A well-designed alarm system can quickly
provide the appropriate information to process op-
erators in unsafe situations, supporting them to
identify the cause and restore the plant to normal
operations. The main problem with basic alarm
management is that these features are static. Hence,
a classical alarm management system does not re-
spond to changes in the mode of operation or in the
operating conditions. In this article, predictive
alarm management (PAM) is recommended to im-
prove the reliability of APC systems since PAM is
an important goal as the operator’s ability to re-
spond to an alarm in a timely fashion determines
the degree of success in preventing loss.
As it has been mentioned, PAM systems should
be able to not only detect the alarm in an early
stage, but to give advice to process operators which
safety action must be applied. Apart from these re-
quirements, PAM systems should be able to deter-
mine PST during the operation in order to inform
the process operator when the highlighted safety ac-
tion should be taken. Usually, process hazards can-
not be avoided with the application of possible
safety actions at the time of detection (e.g. in case
of reactor runaway there is a last controllable oper-
ating point at each manipulation before the reactor
becomes unstable, see in Fig. 1). Because safety ac-
tions can have different time demand to avoid the
evolution of the unsafe situation, PST must be de-
termined in every time step in case of all safety ac-
tions.
For the predictive analysis of the process not
only is a detailed (accurate) process model required,
but also a process simulator that is able to estimate
trajectories of process variables in case of normal
and abnormal operations. This simulator should
also be able to model the dynamical behaviour of
the control system, including its safety elements.
This knowledge is extremely important, since these
elements of the control system determine and some-
times “widen” the region of safe operation.
To allow the industrial implementation of the
proposed approach, an algorithm has been devel-
oped (see Fig. 2) to determine the PST in case of all
the suggested safety actions in different operating
regimes. Such knowledge is extremely useful, since
it can be interpreted as (multivariate) constraints
defined on the process variables that can be given
to operators of the process, built into the control
system, or into an optimization algorithm used for
the optimization of the operation.
As Fig. 2 illustrates, the first step of the pro-
posed methodology is the application of the classi-
cal Lyapunov’s stability analysis. In case the algo-
rithm is unable to find at least one unstable state
during the operation of a prediction horizon, then
the simulation stops. Otherwise, it starts to find the
last controllable state. The algorithm tests all the
possible safety actions and determines which can be
applied to avoid the development of the detected
unstable state. The developed process model is ap-
plied to simulate the effect of the determined safety
elements and to check which elements can be ap-
plied to avoid unstable operation.
To check the effect of safety actions in avoid-
ing the development of abnormal situations, the al-
gorithm makes one step back in simulation time
since the aim of this analysis is to find the last con-
trollable state. Effects of all possible safety actions
are simulated by solving the process model in that
simulation time. When the current state is stable,
the analyzed safety element will be labelled as it
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can be used to avoid the development of runaway,
and that state will be labelled as the last controlla-
ble state. Otherwise, the algorithm makes another
step back in simulation time until it finds a stable
state. To speed up the search for the last controlla-
ble state of the process, the classical secant method,
used to solve univariate equations, is applied in the
algorithm. The time difference between the first un-
stable and last controllable states is calculated in
case of every safety element that seems to be appli-
cable in avoiding the development of unstable
states. This time difference is process safety time
(PST). Finally, the algorithm selects the best safety
element that requires the least PST.
Apart from determining PST, the introduced al-
gorithm can be applied to explore the stable and un-
stable operating regimes of a process. Hence, dur-
ing the operation of the process it can be used as
PAM system. In this work, the developed algorithm
is applied to determine the PST based on the char-
acterization of the boundaries of stable operating
regions. To achieve this aim, the developed algo-
rithm should analyze the model of the safety system
in case of several randomly generated inlet and ini-
tial conditions. The determined boundaries are hy-
per-surfaces in state phase, which represent the last
controllable and first unstable operating points. The
difference between these hyper-surfaces is the PST
in each case.
After the characterization of unstable regions
of operation, the results can be applied to design the
inlet conditions of the reactor, and certainly the re-
sults can also be applied during the operation. If the
measured state variables exceed the boundary of
controllability, the first unstable state will occur
soon and the operator should be warned to make
some modifications in operating conditions. When
the state variables cross the boundary of stability,
the reactor becomes unstable at that moment and
the process hazard cannot be avoided.
To sum up the proposed tool for PAM, at first
all the knowledge about the analyzed system must
be collected and arranged in a model. To analyze
the effect of possible manipulations, a review of the
safety system is required. All this information is
enough to compile the proposed tool based on the
earlier introduced algorithm. In the next section, the
proposed approach is applied in case of an indus-
trial benchmark problem.
3. Application of the developed
algorithm in an industrial problem
The applicability of the previously introduced
approach and algorithm is introduced in this section
in characterization of safe and controllable operat-
ing regimes. The studied vertically built up reactor
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F i g . 2 – Developed algorithm to determine PST
contains a large number of tubes with catalyst as
shown in Fig. 3. A highly exothermic reaction takes
place as reactants rise up in the tubes and pass
through the fixed bed of catalyst particles. In this
reactor, it is important to prevent the development
of reactor runaway during the operation to decrease
the speed of catalyst ageing. The generated heat is
removed by the cooling agent circulating around
the tubes in the reactor jacket. Only the properties
of inlet and outlet streams are continuously mea-
sured to monitor the reactor and check the safety of
operation. Steady-state temperature profiles are col-
lected every 3–6 months to check the activity of
catalytic bed. To track the development of stability
boundaries, a detailed dynamic model should be de-
veloped.
3.1. Introduction to mathematical model
of the investigated tubular reactor
Since a dynamical model is required to simu-
late the behaviour of the reactor, in addition to the
geometric independent parameter, time must be also
considered in the proposed model. Hence, a one-di-
mensional dynamic model has been developed to
simulate the dynamic behaviour of the reactor. The
complexity of the model allows observing how the
boundaries of stability are developing in time along
the catalytic bed. Since two independent variables
must be considered, the developed model contains
partial differential equations (PDEs) besides the or-
dinary and scalar expressions. All variables in
PDEs correspond to the time and the position in
catalytic bed along the longitudinal axis.
Reactor inside, i.e. the catalytic bed and the
flowing gas are considered as a quasi-single phase
and an overall reaction kinetic expression is applied
to calculate the reaction rate.32 The assumptions con-
sidered in this model are summarized as follows:
– reaction takes place in the considered
quasi-single phase;
– the following reaction is considered:
A B C    . (1)
– to calculate the rate of reaction the
Langmuir-Hinshelwood kinetic33 is modified with a













































where the following Arrhenius-type expression is
















– gas and solid temperature are considered uni-
form at every reactor length location;
– the radial state-variable gradients are ne-
glected;
– axial dispersion is neglected;
– external resistance to mass and heat transport
to particles is neglected;
– to calculate pressure drop along the packed



































Based on these simplifications, the model struc-
ture in Fig. 4 was developed. As shown in Fig. 4, the
jacket and the tubes are connected by the heat trans-
port. Three components are in the investigated sys-
tem, so three component balances and two heat bal-
ances must be built into the model. In the material
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F i g . 3 – Simplified scheme of the investi-
gated tubular reactor
In the heat balance of tubes, the convective
flux, the heat produced by the reaction, and the heat
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where the heat flux density is calculated by the fol-
lowing correlation:
J T T GW G W( ). (7)
The reaction takes place only in tubes, so the
heat produced by the reaction is not considered in
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The explanation of model variables can be
found in the notation list. All the missing model pa-
rameters have been identified by comparing mea-
sured and calculated temperature profiles. The tar-
get function is the sum of squares error. A con-
strained minimum searching algorithm based on the
trust region-reflective method was applied to find
the global extrema of the defined target function.34
Since the examined reactor is part of an industrial
process, the nominal values of the reactor and the
operating conditions cannot be given. However, the
identified kinetic parameters are collected in the no-
tation list. The measured and the calculated profiles
(generated by solving the model with the fitted pa-
rameters) can be visually compared in Fig. 5 in the
case of eight different operating conditions. All the
measured temperature values have been divided by
the maximal temperature of each profile and give
a dimensionless temperature, which is the vertical
axis in Fig. 5. However, the horizontal axis is dimen-
sionless length. The reactor simulator has been de-
veloped in MATLAB and it can be downloaded
from http://fmt.uni-pannon.hu/softcomp/. Every op-
erating and reactor parameter characterizing the in-
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F i g . 4 – Hierarchical structure of the investigated tubular
reactor
F i g . 5 – Result of the parameter identification procedure
dustrial process and reactor has been modified in
this simulator.
3.2. Determination of PST in different
operating regimes of a tubular reactor
The aim of this section is to investigate the tu-
bular reactor with a highly exothermic reaction
when manipulations must be performed to keep the
reactor in a controllable region. The introduced dy-
namical model has been solved by using MATLAB.
The evaluation of reactor temperature can be seen
in Fig. 6a. The result of this simulation shows that
the temperature increases very fast near the inlet
position of the reactor, while the temperature maxi-
mum moves in the opposite direction of the reagent
flow during start-up. In this case, the studied pro-
cess can be effectively handled as a quasi-steady
state system, since the residence time is 4.42 s (the
feed of reagents is QG = 0.12 m
3 s–1 and the empty
volume of the reactor is 0.53 m3) – much less than
the average time constant of the system, which is
approximately 180 (as in Fig. 5 that shows the re-
sult of a dynamical simulation experiment). This
confirms that the investigated reactor can be treated
as a quasi steady-state system, and the unsteady
perturbations can be neglected without making a
significant mistake. Lyapunov’s stability analysis is
applied to check the stability of the model in each
time step. The first unstable points in each time step
are collected and plotted in Fig. 6b. In Fig. 6b, it
can be seen that the boundary of stability develops
as the temperature maxima, so the boundary of the
unstable region is moving towards the inlet spot. As
can be seen in Fig. 6b, the first unstable operating
point is detected at 128 s, so the runaway of the re-
actor occurs during this operation and there is a
need for a safety action to prevent the development
of an unsafe situation.
Therefore, PSEs should be considered and
ranked in different cases to enable the selection of
the proper safety action. The examined operating
conditions are summarized in Table 2. The first row
in Table 2 represents a normal operating condition.
The second row shows another normal operating
condition, which is generated from the first one by
varying the nominal values a little to check the reli-
ability of the proposed approach. The third row in-
troduces the values of operating variables in case
that variable is applied as PSE. The first two from
the considered PSEs represent the closing of the
feeding of reagents. The third one is the reduction
of the pressure in the reactor, while the last two
PSEs are the reduction of the feeding temperature
of the reagents and the cooling agent. Many other
PSEs can be determined next to or instead of these.
However, in our case the introduction to the pro-
posed approach is the main target. The feeding of
reagents is modified from the normal conditions to
generate different operating scenarios. All five pos-
sible PSEs are tested in each different scenario in
case of both normal operating conditions.
The proposed approach has been applied to
calculate the PSTs in each scenario for all the con-
sidered PSEs. The calculated PSTs are collected in
Table 3. The time of the first unstable point is the
time step when the instability is detected based on
the applied analysis method. As it can be seen in
Table 3, reactor runaway develops in every investi-
gated scenario. Therefore, the considered PSEs can
be tested at all the generated operating conditions.
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F i g . 6 – Calculated temperature profiles in gas phase (a)
and the evaluation of the stability of reactor model (b) where x
represents the first unstable points along the reactor
T a b l e 2














original 50.5 17.3 1.80 320 325
modified 48.0 16.5 1.75 325 320
safety action 0 0 1.25 290 290
In Table 3, the bracketed values belong to the modi-
fied operating conditions in Table 2. The compari-
son of the time of the first unstable points in each
scenario show that the modified operating condition
in Table 2 is less crucial than the normal condition
from the safety aspect.
The last controllable points are calculated in
each scenario and in case of every PSEs. The PSTs
are calculated as the difference between the first un-
stable and last controllable points. In Table 3, if the
PST is one, that means the investigated PSE has to
be applied at the time of runaway detection. The in-
finity sign denotes that the PSE cannot be used to
avoid the development of runaway in the examined
scenario.
In the first scenario, two of the five possible
safety elements cannot be applied to avoid the de-
velopment of reactor runaway. However, the third
PSE is perfect in the modified conditions for pre-
venting the reactor from the undesired situation.
The second PSE is useful at both analyzed operat-
ing conditions. More PSEs can be applied to avoid
the development of runaway at the modified condi-
tions in the first scenario, which means that the op-
eration with respect to the modified operating con-
ditions is less crucial from the safety aspect.
Further analysis of results shows that the third
PSE works only in the first scenario. The first, sec-
ond and fifth PSEs can be applied in every sce-
nario. Although the calculated PSTs are one in case
of the second PSE in every investigated situation.
Therefore, the second PSE can be perfectly applied
to the investigated scenario as a PSE.
To validate the reliability of the results, the of-
fered PSEs have been tested by tailored simulation
experiments presented in Fig. 7. It is well demon-
strated that the applied safety elements will be ca-
pable of avoiding runaway and will keep the reactor
in safe operation regime if the safety element is ap-
plied in appropriate time.
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T a b l e 3
– PSTs determined by the developed tool in different scenarios
1st scenario: original operating conditions
First unstable: 128 s (166 s) 1st PSE 2nd PSE 3rd PSE 4th PSE 5th PSE
Last controllable [s] 90 (121) 127 (165) 0 (165) 0 (0) 115 (165)
PST [s] 38 (45) 1 (1)  (1)  () 13 (1)
2nd scenario: the feeding volume of reagent B is increased by 10 %
First unstable: 121 s (156 s) 1st PSE 2nd PSE 3rd PSE 4th PSE 5th PSE
Last controllable [s] 89 (115) 120 (155) 0 (0) 0 (0) 96 (155)
PST [s] 32 (41) 1 (1)  ()  () 25 (1)
3rd scenario: the feeding volume of reagent B is increased by 100 %
First unstable: 110 s (138 s) 1st PSE 2nd PSE 3rd PSE 4th PSE 5th PSE
Last controllable [s] 87 (111) 109 (137) 0 (0) 0 (0) 77 (129)
PST [s] 23 (27) 1 (1)  ()  () 33 (9)
4th scenario: the feeding volume of reagent B is increased by 90 %
First unstable: 109 s (137 s) 1st PSE 2nd PSE 3rd PSE 4th PSE 5th PSE
Last controllable [s] 85 (109) 108 (137) 0 (0) 0 (0) 74 (126)
PST [s] 24 (28) 1 (1)  ()  () 35 (11)
5th scenario: the feeding volume of reagent A is decreased by 33.3 %
First unstable: 118 s (152 s) 1st PSE 2nd PSE 3rd PSE 4th PSE 5th PSE
Last controllable [s] 83 (106) 117 (151) 0 (0) 0 (0) 109 (151)
PST [s] 35 (52) 1 (1)  ()  () 11 (1)
6th scenario: the feeding volume of reagent A is decreased by 35 %
First unstable: 118 s (153 s) 1st PSE 2nd PSE 3rd PSE 4th PSE 5th PSE
Last controllable [s] 83 (106) 117 (152) 0 (0) 0 (0) 110 (152)
PST [s] 35 (47) 1 (1)  ()  () 8 (1)
Conclusions
The development of safety instrumented Sys-
tems and the identification of possible hazards by
any kind of process hazard analysis techniques re-
quire well detailed knowledge about the technol-
ogy. Unfortunately, in the application of these tech-
niques the time aspect of operation and the dynami-
cal behaviour of the process are neglected.
The article introduces a possible aspect for the
consideration of time in the development of process
safety elements, and definition of the connection be-
tween the process and time by using the process
safety time term. It also presents a methodology for
the determination of process safety time based on pro-
cess simulator and applied in the development of pro-
cess safety elements. The developed methodology is
based on dynamical analysis of the system and on the
possible safety actions. Based on this methodology, an
algorithm has been developed to detect unsafe situa-
tions and determine the necessary safety action to
avoid it. The algorithm has been applied to explore
the stable and unstable operating regimes of an indus-
trial tubular reactor with a highly exothermic reaction,
and to determine which safety action must be per-
formed to prevent the development of unsafe situa-
tions. Besides these results, the algorithm has been
also used to determine the process safety time for
each of the considered safety elements.
In existing and operating processes, the pro-
posed methodology can be applied to revise and
tune the process alarm system. Furthermore, at the
design stage of the process this tool can be used to
determine the proper safety elements by selection
of critical operating variables.
The main contribution is that the developed
methodology can be applied to analyze complex
processes in the chemical industry in which the crit-
ical conditions cannot be a priori defined.35 In case
of complex process systems, the last controllable
time is not only the function of the operating pa-
rameters of the process unit, but also the elements
of the protection layer. These together define a
complex analysis task that cannot be analytically
handled. The main contribution of this paper is the
introduction of a numerical analysis-based method-
ology that can estimate PSTs related to the PSEs.
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F i g . 7 – Avoiding the development of reactor runaway by applying the possible safety actions in appropriate time
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N o t a t i o n l i s t
–  heat transfer coefficient, 2.93e1 + 3.43e–2 · TG,
W m–2 K–1
A  contact area, 1.413e0, m2
S  cross-section area of catalytic bed, 2.826e–1, m2
Q  volume flow rate, m3 s–1
ci  concentration, where i  { ; ; },A B C mol m
–3
cp  specific heat capacity, J kg
–1 K–1
rH  heat of reaction, 1.12e
5, J mol–1
dp  diameter of catalyst particle, 3.5e
–3, m
  solid phase/catalytic bed volume ratio, 6.3e–1, –
EA  activation energy, 2.14e
4, J mol–1
fc  constant in Ergun-equation, 9.869e
–6, –
J  heat flux density, W m–2
K  reaction equilibrium constant, –
k0  pre-exponential factor, 1.903e
1, mol m–3 s–1
  dimensionless reactor length, –
n  reaction order exponents [ ],n n nA B C
[1.05 0.55 0.88], –
i  stoichiometric number, –
p  pressure, Pa
pi  partial pressure of components, Pa
r  rate of reaction, mol kg–1 s–1
R  ideal gas constant, 8.314e0, J mol–1 K–1
Re  Reynold’s number, –
  density, kg m–3
T  temperature, K
  dimensionless temperature, –
V  volume, 8.478e0, m3
x  reactor length, 3.0e0, m
S u p e r s c r i p t s
G  gas phase
S  solid phase
W  jacket
GW  transport between gas phase and jacket
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